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Philosophy Department, University of Rochester 
 
Cambridge mathematician and philosopher W. K. Clifford (1879/1999) concluded his famous essay, “The 
Ethics of Belief” with the bold claim that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe 
anything upon insufficient evidence” (p.77). Clifford’s enthusiasm for evidentialism—the principle that one 
should proportion one’s belief to the strength of the evidence—may have been overzealous, but a 
plausible interpretation of his view is this: Because beliefs often have serious moral consequences, one 
should base one’s beliefs on the evidence, and it is intellectually and morally irresponsible not to do so. 
This perspective motivates recent so-called “evidence-based” methods in the fields of medicine and 
education. 
 
Balcombe’s (2000, 2001) case for replacing learning methods that require pain, suffering, and death for 
animals with methods that do not (computer-assisted learning, three-dimensional models, videotapes, 
and other alternatives) can be seen as motivated by this evidentialist perspective. Balcombe provided a 
wealth of empirical evidence from educational studies to show that in most contexts animal dissection is 
not necessary—and even counterproductive—to achieve valid educational goals, especially higher order 
goals (concept learning and problem solving). He demonstrated that no sound defense of dissection has 
been given. 
 
In her response, Rasmussen (2001) summarized Balcombe’s case: 
 
Can we learn as effectively without hurting or killing another being? If so, why do we not 
try? Many of the studies Balcombe cites have supported sufficiently the adequacy and, 
often, superiority of learning methods that do not harm animals or students.…The first of 
the aforementioned questions is being answered; we can learn effectively with these non-
detrimental methods. Those who seek to educate [and accept the principle of “do no 
harm”] must seize the second question because they see, in the big picture, the benefit 
for themselves, their students, their society, and other sentient beings. (p. 132) 
 
Other commentators often fail to address Balcombe’s pedagogical, scientific, and moral arguments and 
engage the evidence he presented. Their support of dissection thereby is not evidence based. Their 
unjustified belief in the importance of dissection, widely held by instructors in science and health 
professions, has moral consequences for students; society; and, especially, the animals who suffer and 
die because of it. In this article I summarize their criticisms and respond. 
 
Moore (2001) and, to a lesser extent, Marr (2001), focused on alleged benefits for humans that come 
from animal dissection in medical research. Moore claimed that dissection “has produced knowledge that 
has improved our lives … reduced needless pain and suffering…has been important for developing 
vaccines, cancer treatments, and surgical procedures … and [has] been critical to … prolonging [human] 
life” (pp. 136–137). Marr suggested that “whole animal models” (p. 139) are needed for testing drugs for 
humans and falsely states that, historically, human anatomy and physiology could not have been 
understood without animal dissection (p. 139). 
 
I have two replies: First, these claims are irrelevant to the issue of whether dissection is necessary for 
educational purposes. Second, they assume that animal models are reliable and effective for 
understanding and curing human diseases. This assumption has been seriously criticized in light of the 
history of medicine, comparative physiology, and evolutionary theory (Goodall, 2000; Greek & Greek, 
2000, 2002; LaFollette&Shanks, 1993a, 1993b, 1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1996). If the critics’ arguments are 
sound (and no one has shown that they are not), then, contrary to Marr’s (2001) claims, it is false that 
students who wish to improve human health by “[becoming] involved in pharmacology, anatomy, and the 
medical aspects of biology need a basic framework that uses animal models as the underpinning” (p. 
140). 
 
Although Moore (2001) believed education would be “hindered” by banning earthworm dissection and 
seemed to suspect that “enhancing science education depends on dissecting rats,” (p. 137), he gave no 
evidence for these claims. Valli (2001) and Marr (2001) argued, however, that alternatives to dissection 
are appropriate for precollege and nonmajor biology courses. For these students, Valli found that 
“alternative methods of learning animal anatomy appear to be adequate” (p. 127). Marr emphasized that  
dissection “has absolutely no place in the precollege classroom” (p. 140) and that it is not even necessary  
for biology majors whose interests are in other areas of biology. Here, Balcombe (2000) and his critics 
agreed. Advocates of humane education surely would find progress were Valli’s and Marr’s views widely 
accepted among biology teachers.  
 
Disagreements, however, concern dissection and students in the health professions. Concerning medical 
students, Valli (2001) claimed that “what is critical is that the professional colleges, to produce competent 
graduates, provide sufficient hands-on animal experience with both live and dead animals” (p. 127). He 
asserted that “the sensitivity gained to the feel and smell of fresh or fixed animal tissue is in itself a core 
component of a medical education” (p. 128). He claimed, “For students who plan to practice medicine, the 
more exposure they have to the sight, smell, and texture of tissues, the better their preparation to become 
confident clinicians” (p. 129). 
 
Again, these claims are only assertions: No evidence is given. Furthermore, the research that Balcombe 
(2000) reviewed shows that Valli’s (2001) claims are false. This is to be expected, as it is implausible 
prima facie that physicians would be less competent or confident had they not dissected animals. Animal 
dissection is not necessary to enter medical school or to practice or teach medicine: If it were 
educationally essential, then it would be required (Bekoff, 2002). 
 
Valli (2001) correctly noted that physicians need to learn hand–eye coordination, the texture of tissues, 
and instrumental techniques. Valli also noted that veterinarians need to learn safe animal handling and 
restraint; intubation; anesthesia and monitoring; the effects and control of bleeding; and the sight, smell, 
and feel of live tissues (pp. 129–130). However, clearly there are ways to learn these skills in both 
medical and veterinary contexts that do not harm any animals. Experience working in a clinic, assisting 
professionals, works very well, as Valli noted. It is likely that on-the-job education and training is more 
effective. Thus, no reason is given to believe that animal dissection is needed for students, at least in the 
human health professions. 
 
Veterinary students clearly need to be familiar with their patients’ anatomy; some dissection is necessary. 
Balcombe (2000) clearly recognized this in his support of client-donated and ethically sourced animal 
cadaver programs at www.educationalmemorial.org. Balcombe (2002) showed, however, that there are 
many viable alternatives to terminal-surgery laboratories, that students who use alternatives are just as 
competent and confident, and that this “provide[s] a strong case for the replacement of traditional labs in 
which healthy animals are killed” (pp. 123–124). It is not clear why Balcombe’s (2000) critics disagree. 
 
Concerning terminal research designed to benefit animals, we do not allow nonconsenting humans to be 
experimented on and killed for the sake of other humans. Ethical constraints prohibit the conduction of 
research to enhance “our knowledge of life,” satisfy personal curiosity, or spark scientific inspiration 
(Moore, 2001). It is doubtful that strong arguments could be found to morally justify these protections for 
humans but not for animals. 
 
Balcombe (2000) demonstrated that alternatives to dissection are educationally sound. No successful 
objections to his arguments have been given. Most animals who are dissected suffer greatly in their 
procurement and, obviously, all die (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 1990). This raises 
serious and broad moral questions concerning society’s treatment of animals. The views of defenders 
and even critics of animal rights imply that the status quo concerning dissection is, at least, highly morally 
objectionable (Cohen & Regan, 2001; Engel, 2001; Nobis, 2002; Sapontzis, 1995). There are no moral, 
religious, or legal objections to the use of alternatives (Francione & Charleton, 1992). Dissection is costly; 
alternatives are cheaper. The evidence is clear: From both educational and moral perspectives, with 
exceptions for only some select aspects of veterinary curricula, animal dissection is indefensible. To deny 
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